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Abstract 
We study the causal impact of revealing pro-unionism during 
the recruitment stage on hiring chances. To this end, we 
conduct a randomised field experiment in the Belgian labour 
market. When matched with employer and sector data, the 
experimentally gathered data enable us to test the 
heterogeneity of discrimination against pro-union applicants 
by the union density in the sector and the size of the firm. We 
find that disclosure of pro-unionism affects hiring chances in a 
negative way and that – in line with our expectations based on 
the literature – this negative impact is stronger in highly 
unionised sectors. 
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1 Introduction 
During the last several decades, economists have expressed a deep interest 
in studying employers’ resistance to unionism and union organising. On the 
one hand, this managerial resistance may be, as argued by Dundon (2002), 
due to employers’ ideological distaste of unionism and the different 
cultural attitudes between employers and unions toward, for instance, 
corporate identity, long hours, unpaid overtime and performance 
monitoring (Dundon, 2002). On the other hand, this opposition is related to 
the fact that employers see unions as interfering with their cost 
minimisation and profit maximisation goals. Based on a literature review 
on the relationship between unionism and economic performance by 
Hirsch (2004), the latter source of opposition seems to be rational to some 
extent: overall, it is found that profits and productivity growth are affected 
in a non-positive way by unionism. This is directly related to unions’ 
success in bargaining for above-market wages or in capturing quasi-rents 
and may be indirectly mediated by the empirical finding that unionised 
employees are, on average, more often on sick leave and less job-satisfied 
than non-unionised employees (Freeman and Kleiner, 1999).1 
On the one hand, this managerial opposition to unionism leads to 
strategic policy against unions as a whole with respect to employers. 
Former studies on labour-management disputes show how employers 
prevent unions from forming, weaken existing unions and apply pressure 
on unions during negotiations (see, for instance, Gall (2004) and Heery and 
Simms (2010) for the United Kingdom; Cooke (1985a, 1985b) and Lawler 
                                                     
1 There are, however, some exceptions to this finding. See, for instance, the recent evidence on the effect of 
trade union activities on productivity in Japan provided by Morikawa (2010). 
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and West (1985) for the United States). 
On the other hand, also at the individual employee level, union 
membership and union activism may lead to unfavourable treatment by 
employers. Former research provides suggestive evidence for a negative 
impact of (disclosed) union affiliation on hiring chances, job tenure and 
wages (Cooke, 1985b; Leap et al., 1990; Redman et al., 1990; Saltzman, 
1995; Servais, 1977; van den Broek, 2003). Most of these contributions rely 
on the qualitative analysis of unfair labour practices heard by national 
labour relation boards or the analysis of recruitment methods (designed to 
be antithetic to workplace unionism) and therefore do not provide a clear 
measure of discrimination based on union affiliation. The other studies are 
based on surveyed employee or employer perceptions on unequal 
treatment based on union affiliation. These researchers’ results are 
inherently subjective and may be driven by the survey participants’ goal to 
demonstrate the (non-)existence of discrimination. An exception is 
Saltzman (1995) matching data on real job applicants eager to vote for 
union representation with their hiring outcomes. Notwithstanding his 
ingenious research design, however, Saltzman’s (1995) results also cannot 
be interpreted as causal because applicants who appear very similar based 
on the observable characteristics in the researcher’s data except for their 
pro-union view may look very different with respect to employers in 
various aspects that are unobservable to the researcher but drive 
productivity (such as motivation and ability). 
In this study, we are the first to estimate hiring discrimination against 
pro-union job candidates in a direct way. To this end, we conduct a field 
experiment in Flanders (i.e. the northern, Dutch-speaking part of Belgium) 
in which fictitious job applications of school-leavers are sent to real job 
openings. The fictitious applicants are randomised over the (treatment of) 
disclosure of the membership of the youth wing of a trade union. By 
monitoring the subsequent call-back by this disclosure, unequal treatment 
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is identified directly and can be interpreted in a causal way. Because, by 
construction, the employer’s entire decision making information is under 
our control, we are able to disentangle employer discrimination from all 
alternative explanations of heterogeneous hiring outcomes such as 
differences in human capital and differential employee preferences. 
When matched with employer and sector data, the experimentally 
gathered data enable us to test two formerly established hypotheses in the 
context of individual union affiliation and labour market discrimination in a 
direct way. On the one hand, we test the hypothesis that unfavourable 
treatment of pro-union job applicants is higher in sectors where union 
density is high. Previous confrontations with trade unions in these sectors 
may encourage employers to try to prevent further strengthening of these 
unions. Moreover, employers in these sectors may have already found out 
that the probability of detection of unequal treatment is quite small. On 
the other hand, we hypothesise that discrimination against pro-union job 
applicants is higher in small firms. There are at least three reasons why this 
may be the case. First, larger companies are, on average, more likely to 
have a dedicated human resources department and standardised 
recruitment procedures. These more professional approaches to 
recruitment may result in a lower impact of individual recruiter 
preferences and – ipso facto – in a lower level of discrimination 
(irrespective of the discrimination ground). Second, in many countries, 
among which Belgium, small companies are not obliged to have union 
representation within (the company committee of) the firm. However, 
individual employees may try to enforce (formal or informal) union impact. 
Therefore, small companies may fear that recruiting pro-union employees 
might instigate union action within the firm. Third, related to the former 
reason, unions often have a much stronger position in large firms, which 
makes discrimination based on union membership riskier (Goerke and 
Pannenberg, 2011; Wauters et al., 2014; Wood et al., 2009; Woodhams 
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and Lupton, 2006).2 
The remainder of this article is structured in the following way. In the 
next section, we will provide the reader with a brief description of the 
institutional setting concerning trade unions in Belgium (and ipso facto in 
Flanders). In Section 3, we present the design of our randomised field 
experiment aimed at measuring labour market discrimination against pro-
union applicants on the one hand and testing the additional research 
hypotheses formulated in the former paragraph on the other hand. In 
Section 4, we present our research results based on a statistical 
examination of the experimentally gathered data. Finally, we present our 
conclusions regarding the research, as well as several limitations. 
2 Institutional Context 
Together with the Scandinavian countries, Belgium is characterised by a 
fairly high union density, i.e., a high share of union members among the 
wage and salary earners. In 2009, approximately 52% of employees were 
unionised. In contrast with most other European countries, this rate was 
quite stable during the last three decades (Liagre, 2012; Van Rie et al., 
2011). Moreover, as summarised by Liagre (2012), union density is not 
significantly heterogeneous by age and firm size. On the other hand, union 
density varies by sector. It is the highest (higher than 70%) in the sectors of 
agriculture, manufacture of wood, manufacture of fabricated metal 
products, electricity, gas and water supply, construction and water 
transport and the lowest (lower than 35%) in the sectors of computer and 
                                                     
2 From an empirical point of view, the latter hypothesis is confirmed in an indirect way by Goerke & Pannenberg 
(2011) finding a negative effect of union membership on individual dismissals in large firms and by Woodhams 
and Lupton (2006) finding a positive effect of the presence of an HR professional at the firm, which is more 
common in large firms, on equality policies. 
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related activities. An explanation for the high union density in Belgium, as 
provided by Van Rie et al. (2011), is the presence of the so-called Ghent 
system, i.e., a system of – in the case of Belgium, compulsory – 
unemployment insurance that is subsidised by the public authorities but in 
which trade unions provide benefits to the unemployed. 
Maybe even more importantly, the coverage rate, that is the rate of 
employers whose labour market situations are regulated by a collective 
agreement bargained by the union, is approximately 96% (Ajzen, 2013). 
The Belgian industrial relations system can be described as both highly self-
organising and highly structured (Fulton, 2011; Liagre, 2012; Omey, 2013). 
It is based on compromise between employer organisations and trade 
unions meeting each other at the national, sectoral and firm levels. The 
negotiations held in sectoral joint committees composed of 
representatives of employers active in the sector and the three most 
important trade union confederations (cf. infra) are important. These 
negotiations, about wages and labour conditions (quality of work), lead to 
collective labour agreements that are binding for all employers and 
employees in the industries covered by these committees (Ajzen, 2013; 
Liagre, 2012; Omey, 2013). 
Abstracting from a few independent unions covering workers in 
particular Belgian regions, occupations and firms, Belgian trade unions are 
divided into three competing confederations. First, the “General 
Federation of Belgian Labour” is a Socialist trade union, (initially) inspired 
by Marxist theory and the related “Class conflict”. The Socialist trade union 
is, more than the other two confederations, focussed on confrontation 
with employers and outspoken in its support of government interference 
via economic planning and control and of nationalisation of basic services. 
Second, the “Confederation of Christian Trade Unions” is linked to the 
Christian movement and – to some extent – to the Christian democratic 
political party. The Christian union aims, in the spirit of important Papal 
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Social Encyclicals such as Rerum Novarum, at a peaceful cooperation 
between social classes. Third, the “General Confederation of Liberal Trade 
Unions” is linked to the Belgian Liberal party and is comparable to the 
Christian trade union in its aim of a peaceful cooperation between 
employers and employees (Liagre, 2012, Omey, 2013). The Liberal union, 
however, is more outspoken in its plea against outrageous government 
intervention. The market shares of the Socialist, Christian and Liberal trade 
unions amounted to approximately 41%, 50% and 9%, respectively, in 2010 
(Faniel and Vandaele, 2012).  
The aforementioned confederations are comprised of several unions 
organised at the sectoral and/or occupational levels. The membership of a 
union is organised at this level (and not at the national level of the 
confederations). It is important for the remainder of the present study that 
all three aforementioned confederations have youth wings targeting 
student workers, graduates, interns, youth in part-time education and 
young employees. Members of the youth wing of a trade union 
(confederation) are automatically also members of the mother wing of this 
union. These members are perceived, at least by the contact people of the 
confederations we spoke with, as more committed compared to the 
“average” trade union member. The membership of the youth wing of a 
union is organised at the regional (i.e., Flemish or Walloon) level. 
3 The Experiment 
3.1 Causal Evidence of Hiring Discrimination by means of a Field 
Experiment 
As mentioned in Section 1, and to the best of our knowledge, all former 
quantitative contributions to the literature on labour market discrimination 
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against pro-union employees have been based on non-experimental data 
and, more concretely, on survey data. In general, these studies suffer from 
two important statistical problems that make a causal interpretation of 
their analyses problematic. Based on survey data, one might not be able to 
address the endogeneity of (disclosure of) union affiliation with respect to 
labour market chances. First, job candidates who appear similar to 
researchers (except for their union affiliation characteristics) based on 
standard non-experimental data may look very different to employers. No 
conclusive proof of unequal treatment can be provided by means of 
regressions on these data, as researchers cannot control all relevant 
variables taken into account by employers in making their hiring, 
remuneration and promotion decisions. Second, it is possible that 
individuals with better economic outcomes – who may be more confident 
in their interaction both with interviewers and colleagues – are more 
willing to disclose their pro-union position. This may lead to an upwards 
bias of the measured outcomes of pro-union candidates. Based on other 
assumptions, a downwards bias is also possible. 
To overcome the mentioned methodological problems, in this study, we 
gather data through an experimental approach. Specifically, we conduct a 
field experiment in which, in the spirit of Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) 
studying ethnic discrimination in the United States, fictitious job 
applications are sent to real job openings. These applications are assigned 
to the treatment of disclosure of pro-unionism in a random fashion. By 
monitoring the subsequent call-backs from the employer side, unequal 
treatment is identified in a direct way and can be given a causal 
interpretation. All supply side characteristics are, by construction, equal for 
treated and control candidates. Thereby, the finding of call-back that is 
statistically significantly more or less in favour of our pro-union applicants 
can only be due to disclosure of this membership. 
More concretely, we conducted our experiment between October 2013 
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and March 2014 in the Flemish labour market. Two applications of male job 
candidates with two years of relevant work experience, only differing in the 
characteristic that one indicated his membership in the youth wing of a 
trade union, were sent to 280 vacancies. These vacancies were randomly 
selected from the database of the Public Employment Agency of Flanders 
(VDAB), the region’s major job search channel. We selected jobs in the 
private sector for two middle-low- and two middle-high-skilled 
occupations: operator, administrative clerk, industrial engineer and 
management assistant. We chose these particular occupations to obtain 
some variation in the selected vacancies’ sectors. 
3.2 Construction of Fictitious Applications 
For each occupation in which we selected vacancies, we created two 
template applications comprised of a resume and a cover letter. We will 
refer to these applications as the “type A” and “type B” applications. These 
applications were equal in all productivity-relevant characteristics but 
differed in lay-out and details such as the particularly mentioned sports 
club. To ensure that our job applications were realistic and representative, 
example applications of the VDAB were used and calibrated for our 
purposes. 
The type A and type B applicants were single males born, studying and 
living in comparable suburbs of Ghent, the second largest city of Flanders. 
These applicants graduated from secondary or tertiary education in June 
2011 without any grade retention experience. The candidates applying for 
a job as an operator held a secondary education degree in mechanical 
maintenance, those applying for a job as an administrative clerk held a 
secondary education degree in commerce; those applying for a job as an 
industrial engineer, a Master’s degree in industrial engineering; and those 
applying for a job as a management assistant, a Bachelor’s degree in 
business administration. All of the applicants graduated from the same 
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type of school, with a comparable reputation. Between August 2011 and 
October 2013 (the start of our experiment), the fictitious applicants were 
employed in an occupation equal to the one for which they applied in the 
experiment. A reason for the termination of their first job was not provided 
in the application. 
Furthermore, we added to the type A and type B applications the 
following characteristics: Belgian nationality, Dutch mother tongue, driver’s 
license, adequate English and French language skills and adequate IT skills. 
The cover letters indicated a person who was highly interested, motivated 
and organised. For the candidates applying for the jobs as an industrial 
engineer or as a management assistant, sport activities were also added. 
Last, we appended a fictitious postal address (based on real streets in 
middle-class neighbourhoods) and a date of birth to all application 
templates. 
3.3 Randomised Disclosure of Pro-unionism 
We sent two fictitious job applications, one of type A and one of type B, to 
each selected vacancy. In one member of each pair (the “treated” 
member), the applicant indicated that he was a member of the youth wing 
of a Flemish trade union. This was done in the resume’s “Other activities” 
section, in which it is common in Flanders to mention memberships. We 
opted for the membership of the youth wing of a union and not for the 
membership of the “mother” wing of the union for the following reason. In 
Flanders, as mentioned in Section 2, the membership of a classical trade 
union is related to the sector and/or occupation of the job in which one is 
employed. As a result, this membership might be (become) irrelevant when 
moving to another firm. Therefore, mentioning the membership of a 
classical trade union in the “Other activities” section of the resume would 
not have been realistic and would potentially have led to the detection of 
the experiment by some employers. In contrast, the membership of the 
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youth wing of a trade union is, as mentioned in Section 2, organised at the 
regional (so Flemish) level and is not related to a particular job. Therefore, 
disclosing membership of such a youth wing in the “Other activities” 
section of the resume of a youth unemployed is (more) realistic. In 
addition, membership of the youth wing of a trade union is a stronger 
signal of union affiliation (or at least as unambiguous) than mother wing 
membership given that it cannot be prompted by motives related to the 
union’s position in the provision of unemployment benefits (see Section 2) 
and given the relatively low fraction of workers affiliated with a youth 
wing.3  
In the other member of each pair (the “control” member), the applicant 
indicated that he was a member of a drama club. This was done to give 
both the treated and control candidates a signal of social engagement. By 
construction, we gave no direct indication of the control candidate’s views 
towards unions. Therefore, this applicant could also have been a pro-union 
candidate not disclosing his membership. The comparison of treated 
candidates versus control candidates in our framework is therefore actually 
a comparison of “openly” union members on the one hand and candidates 
with an unrevealed view towards unions on the other hand. As a result, 
this comparison in fact captures the costs associated with disclosing union 
membership. 
To eliminate any possible effect of the application type (A or B) on 
hiring outcomes, we alternately assigned the treatment of youth union 
membership to the type A and type B applications. As a result, the 
intended randomisation was realised by construction. In addition, we also 
alternated between the memberships of the three important (youth) trade 
unions of Belgium mentioned in Section 2. Subsequently, we sent the 
resulting combinations in an alternating order to the employers, each time 
                                                     
3 For instance, the Flemish Socialist trade union had a membership of 699423 in 2010 while its youth wing had a 
membership of only 28285. 
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with approximately 24 hours in between. 
3.4 Definition of Positive Call-Back 
We registered two email addresses and mobile phone numbers: one for 
the pro-union individuals and one for the individuals not mentioning any 
trade union affiliation. All fictitious job applications were sent to the 
selected real vacancies by email. In view of avoiding detection, we applied 
to no more than one vacancy from the same employer. Call-backs were 
received by email or by telephone voicemail. As we mentioned postal 
addresses with non-existent street numbers in the applications, we could 
not measure reactions from the employer side by regular mail. However, 
several Flemish human resource managers confirmed that, currently, 
employers rarely invite job candidates to selection interviews by the latter 
channel. All reactions from the employer side received later than 30 days 
after sending out the applications were discounted. 
In our analysis of the gathered data, we will distinguish between two 
definitions of positive call-back. Positive call-back in a strict sense is 
defined, in the spirit of Baert (Forthcoming), as the invitation for an 
interview concerning the job for which the fictitious candidate applied. 
Positive call-back in a broad sense includes, in addition to the former 
definition, the request to provide more information, the request to contact 
the employer or the proposal of an alternative job. 
4 Results 
4.1 Do Employers Treat Pro-union Candidates Differently? 
Table 1 describes the experimentally gathered data. Overall, in 58 (99) of 
 
12 
the 280 vacancies, at least one of both fictitious job candidates received a 
positive call-back in a strict sense (broad sense). 33 (67) cases resulted in 
an invitation (any positive reaction) for both the candidate not mentioning 
youth union membership and the candidate mentioning youth union 
membership, 18 (19) cases in an invitation for only the former candidate 
and 7 (13) cases in an invitation for only the latter candidate. 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE. 
 
The net discrimination rate is then calculated by (i) subtracting the 
number of applications for which the candidate mentioning union 
membership was preferred from the number of applications for which the 
candidate not mentioning union membership was preferred and (ii) 
dividing the result by the number of application pairs in which at least one 
candidate received a positive call-back. The result is a net measure of the 
number of discriminatory acts a pro-union applicant could expect to 
encounter per application for which at least one candidate received a 
positive call-back. At the level of the total sample, the net discrimination 
rate is 0.19 when adopting the strict definition of positive call-back. A 
standard χ² test of the hypothesis that the candidates mentioning and not 
mentioning union membership were treated unfavourably equally often is 
rejected at the 5% significance level. The corresponding statistic for the 
broad definition of positive call-back, that is receiving any positive reaction, 
is 0.06, which is not significantly different from 0. 
An alternative measure for unequal treatment, in the spirit of Bertrand 
and Mullainathan (2004), is the positive call-back ratio. This ratio is 
calculated by dividing the percentage of applications for which candidates 
not mentioning union membership received a positive call-back by the 
corresponding percentage for candidates mentioning youth union 
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membership. The resulting ratio is 1.28 using the strict sense definition of 
positive call-back. This positive call-back ratio is significantly different from 
1 at the 5% significance level. This ratio’s value indicates that the 
candidates in our experiment with no disclosed union affiliation received 
28% more invitations for a job interview concerning the job for which they 
applied. Stated otherwise, pro-union candidates received 22% less 
invitations than their counterparts not mentioning union membership.4 
The positive call-back ratio following the broad sense definition of positive 
call-back is 1.08 and not significantly different from 1. 
Based on both the outlined net discrimination rate and the positive call-
back ratio, we conclude that there is evidence of unequal treatment 
against pro-union job candidates in the jobs for which we applied in the 
Flemish job market. We find, however, only unequal treatment with 
respect to the probability of getting an invitation for a job interview and 
not of getting any positive reaction. Additionally, taken together, these 
findings point in the direction of a preference for candidates not 
mentioning any union affiliation as the combination of these findings is 
partly the result of the fact that in 15% of the vacancies for which the pro-
union applicant gets only a positive call-back in the broad sense, the 
applicant not mentioning any union affiliation is immediately invited for a 
job interview. 
4.2 Is Unequal Treatment Heterogeneous by Union Density and 
Firm Size? 
To test whether unequal treatment is heterogeneous by the union density 
within the sector of the firm and by the size of this firm, the experimentally 
gathered data were matched with external statistics on these 
characteristics. This matching was realised by first looking up the company 
                                                     
4 0.22 = 1 – 1/1.28. 
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mentioned in the vacancy within the company database of the Flemish 
financial-economic magazine Trends (http://trendstop.knack.be). In this 
database, the sector of the firm could be found. The union density within 
the sector (at the 2-digit NACE 1.1 level) was proxied by its average number 
of unionised respondents in Round 1 to Round 5 (related to the period 
2002-2010) of the European Social Survey.5 Based on the company 
number, which could also be found in this database of Trends, the firm 
size, proxied by the average number of workers in full-time equivalents in 
2011, was looked up in the database of Bel-first (Bureau Van Dijk). Taking 
into account the missing values in the databases of Trends and Bel-first, we 
were able to construct the union density measure for 67% of the vacancies 
and the firm size measure for 59% of the vacancies. 
The gathered variables on union density and firm size may correlate 
with other employer characteristics, so that descriptive analyses in the 
spirit of the ones presented in the former section based on subsamples of 
the data by union density within the sector of the firm and by the firm’s 
size are not very informative. Therefore, we conduct a regression analysis 
in which we attempt to take into account potential confounders of the 
impact of union density and firm size on discrimination of pro-union 
candidates. In this respect, Schnabel (2013) shows that union density is 
positively related to the business cycle (i.e., growing procyclically), public 
sector employment and firm size. Given the short period of our experiment 
and the fact that we only selected vacancies in the private sector, the 
relationship between union density and discrimination against pro-union 
applicants we find may not be confounded with the correlation between 
union density on the one hand and business cycle and public nature of the 
sector on the other hand. However, Schnabel’s (2013) evidence underlines 
the importance of including both union density and firm size within one 
                                                     
5 This proxy was constructed and supplied by Guy Van Gyes (KU Leuven). NACE 1.1 refers to the Statistical 
Classification of Economic Activities in the European Community as revised in 2002. 
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regression specification. 
Table 2 and Table 3 present our regression results. We regress the 
outcome of positive call-back in a strict sense (Table 2) and in a broad 
sense (Table 3) on various sets of key and control variables by means of a 
linear probability model with resume fixed effects (controlling for random 
effects leads to the same conclusions). For reasons of comparability of the 
regression results, all explanatory variables that are interacted with “Union 
membership” are normalised by subtracting their mean among the 
population of candidates mentioning youth union membership and, for 
continuous variables, by dividing the result by their standard deviation 
among the same population. We do not include these variables without an 
interaction with disclosed youth union membership as they are constant at 
the resume type level and therefore controlled by our fixed-effects 
estimations. In what follows, we first focus on the results outlined in Table 
2. Afterwards, we compare these results with the ones in Table 3. 
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE. 
 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE. 
 
First, in regression (1), we only include union membership disclosure as 
an explanatory variable. We find that revealing this membership lowers the 
chance of a job interview invitation by approximately 4 percentage points. 
Obviously, this outcome equals the difference between the positive call-
back rates in a strict sense among the treated and control candidates 
mentioned in Section 4.1. 
Second, in regression (2), we interact union membership disclosure 
with the union density in the sector of the firm. We get, in line with the 
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expectations outlined in Section 1, a significantly negative effect of this 
interaction variable on the probability of getting an invitation for a job 
interview. Increasing the union density within the sector with one standard 
deviation lowers the chance of an interview invitation by approximately 6 
percentage points for pro-union candidates. In addition, by introducing this 
interaction variable – and ipso facto regressing on a smaller sample for 
which the union density variable could be constructed – the indicator 
variable for union membership disclosure becomes insignificant. In other 
words, based on this subsample of observations, we could not have 
rejected that overall the employers treated pro-union and control 
candidates equally.  
Third, in regression models (3) and (4), we interact union membership 
disclosure with proxies of the firm size. In model (3), we adopt the natural 
logarithm of the average number of workers in full-time equivalents in 
2011. In model (4), we follow the European Commission’s division of firms 
in micro (less than 10 workers), small (10 or more workers but less than 50 
workers) and (middle-)large firms (50 or more workers) by introducing a 
dummy capturing firms with 10 or more workers and a dummy capturing 
firms with 50 or more workers. As mentioned in Section 1, in Belgium a 
private firm is obliged to have union representation when this firm 
employs 50 or more workers. However, neither in column (3) nor in column 
(4) do we obtain significant effects for the firm size variables. The same is 
true when we adopt other specifications including quadratic terms or 
introducing dummies based on other firm size thresholds. 
In regression (5), we combine the variables on union density and firm 
size included in regressions (2) and (3). Last, in regression (6), we extend 
regression model (5) with additional interaction variables capturing the 
occupation, the gender of the recruiter, the contract characteristics 
mentioned in the vacancy and the particular trade union mentioned in the 
application. These approaches lead to an even greater magnitude for the 
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interaction between disclosed union membership and union density in the 
sector. In addition, no other interaction variables are significant. However, 
the relatively high standard errors of regression (6) may reflect a lack of 
statistical power, related to the relatively high number of included 
variables and the relatively small number of observations in this regression. 
The same pattern of results is observed when using the positive call-
back in a broad sense as an outcome variable. However, one remarkable 
result in column (6) of Table 3 is that we obtain a lower chance on any 
positive reaction for pro-union candidates who reveal their affiliation with 
the Socialist trade union. This finding can be explained by the fact, 
mentioned in Section 2, that the Socialist union in Belgium is characterised, 
more than its Christian and Liberal counterparts, by a tradition of 
confrontation rather than of collaboration with employers.  
5 Conclusions 
We reported on the design and the results of a field experiment in which 
fictitious job applications with randomised disclosure of pro-unionism were 
sent to real job openings for operators, administrative clerks, industrial 
engineers and management assistants in Flanders. We found that, at least 
at the total sample level, the fictitious job candidates in our experiment 
who disclosed their membership of the youth wing of a labour member 
obtained 22% less invitations for a job interview. In addition, and in line 
with our theoretical expectations, our results showed that unfavourable 
treatment of pro-union candidates was more outspoken in sectors with 
high levels of union density. Last, we did not find any robust relation 
between the size of the job posting firm and its discriminatory behaviour. 
We acknowledge several research limitations of this study. First, we test 
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for unequal treatment only within the mentioned occupations and only 
within the jobs posted in the database of the Public Employment Agency of 
Flanders. It is possible that discrimination of pro-union candidates is more 
(or less) apparent in sectors other than those covered. However, as this 
limitation is expected to cause a similar shift in the discrimination 
measures in sectors with low and high union densities and for jobs of small 
and large firms, this should not bias the conclusions at the end of the 
previous paragraph. 
Second, our experimental design is effective only in demonstrating 
potential unequal treatment in the initial stage of the recruitment process. 
Thereby, we cannot translate our research results into divergences in job 
offers and wages, let alone in job dismissals. However, Bertrand and 
Mullainathan (2004) argue that to the extent that the recruitment process 
has even important frictions, one would expect that reduced rates in first 
positive reactions would translate into reduced job offers and lower 
earnings. Moreover, for employers it seems to be rational to only invite 
candidates with a substantial probability of getting the posted job. 
Third, for methodological reasons outlined in Section 3.3, we chose 
revealed membership of the youth wing of a trade union as a treatment, 
while the existing literature on the relationship between unionism on the 
one hand and economic performance and labour market discrimination on 
the other hand is related to classical trade unions and the “mother” wing 
membership. However, one should keep in mind that, as mentioned in 
Section 2, these youth members are automatically also members of the 
mother wing of the union. Moreover, we believe that revealed youth wing 
membership is a signal of union affiliation and union support – the signal 
with the effect that we wanted to estimate – that is at least as 
unambiguous as mother wing membership. Therefore, the treatment 
effects we present in this paper might serve as an upper bound for the 
effect of revealed classical union membership. 
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Table 1: The Probability of Positive Call-back: Net Discrimination Rates and Call-Back Ratios. 
 Jobs 
Neither candidate 
positive call-back 
Both candidates 
positive call-back 
Only candidate not 
mentioning union 
membership 
positive call-back 
Only candidate 
mentioning union 
membership 
positive call-back 
NDR χ2 PCR t 
 (No.) (No.) (No.) (No.) (No.)     
A. Positive call-back in strict sense 280 222 33 18 7 0.190** 4.840 1.275** 2.213 
B. Positive call-back in broad sense 280 181 67 19 13 0.061 1.125 1.075 1.060 
Notes. The net discrimination rate (NDR) is calculated by subtracting the number of applications for which the candidate mentioning union membership was preferred from the number of 
applications for which the candidate not mentioning union membership was preferred and dividing by the number of application pairs in which at least one candidate received a positive call-
back. The chi-square test for the NDR tests the null hypothesis that both candidates are treated unfavourably just as frequently. The positive call-back ratio (PCR) is calculated by dividing the 
percentage of applications for which candidates not mentioning union membership received a positive call-back by the corresponding percentage for candidates mentioning union 
membership. The t-test for the PCR tests the null hypothesis that the probability of a positive answer is the same for candidates from both groups. As two applicants contacted the same firm, 
the probability of the applicant not mentioning union membership receiving an invitation correlates with the probability of the applicant mentioning union membership receiving one. 
Therefore, standard errors are corrected for clustering of the observations at the vacancy level. *** (**) ((*)) indicates significance at the 1% (5%) ((10%)) significance level. 
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Table 2: The Probability of Positive Call-back in Strict Sense: Regression Estimates. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Union membership -0.039** (0.019) -0.028 (0.020) -0.024 (0.021) -0.024 (0.021) 0.025 (0.023) 0.027 (0.022) 
Union membership x Union density in sector (normalised)  -0.059** (0.023)   -0.078*** (0.027) -0.075** (0.030) 
Union membership x Log (average FTE at firm) (normalised)   0.003 (0.020)  0.008 (0.026) 0.011 (0.028) 
Union membership x Average FTE at firm > 10 (normalised)    0.009 (0.042)   
Union membership x Average FTE at firm > 50 (normalised)    0.001 (0.064)   
Union membership x Occupation: operator (normalised)      0.033 (0.068) 
Union membership x Occupation: clerk (normalised)      0.045 (0.045) 
Union membership x Occupation: engineer (normalised)      -0.057 (0.089) 
Union membership x Recruiter: male (normalised)      -0.045 (0.046) 
Union membership x Temporary contract (normalised)      -0.002 (0.045) 
Union membership x Part-time contract (normalised)      -0.057 (0.059) 
Union membership x Socialist union (normalised)      -0.082 (0.071) 
Union membership x Christian union (normalised)      -0.028 (0.048) 
Constant 0.182*** (0.009) 0.134*** (0.010) 0.115*** (0.011) 0.115*** (0.011) 0.125*** (0.012) 0.125*** (0.012) 
Linear probability model x x x x x x 
Dependent variable: invitation to a job interview x x x x x x 
Vacancy fixed effects x x x x x x 
Observations 560 358 330 330 288 288 
Notes. See Section 4.2 for a definition of the variables adopted in the regressions. Except for “Union membership”, all variables are normalised by subtracting their mean among the 
population of candidates mentioning youth union membership. Continuous variables are further normalised by dividing by their standard deviation among the same subpopulation. Standard 
errors, corrected for clustering at the vacancy level, are in parentheses. *** (**) ((*)) indicates significance at the 1% (5%) ((10%)) level. 
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Table 3: The Probability of Positive Call-back in Broad Sense: Regression Estimates. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Union membership -0.021 (0.020) -0.028 (0.023) -0.018 (0.025) -0.018 (0.025) -0.026 (0.028) -0.023 (0.026) 
Union membership x Union density in sector (normalised)  -0.041** (0.019)   -0.054** (0.023) -0.043* (0.025) 
Union membership x Log (average FTE at firm) (normalised)   0.001 (0.024)  -0.010 (0.027) -0.009 (0.030) 
Union membership x Average FTE at firm > 10 (normalised)    0.066 (0.049)   
Union membership x Average FTE at firm > 50 (normalised)    -0.041 (0.070)   
Union membership x Occupation: operator (normalised)      0.006 (0.090) 
Union membership x Occupation: clerk (normalised)      0.067 (0.066 
Union membership x Occupation: engineer (normalised)      -0.046 (0.080) 
Union membership x Recruiter: male (normalised)      -0.065 (0.053) 
Union membership x Temporary contract (normalised)      0.042 (0.051) 
Union membership x Part-time contract (normalised)      0.024 (0.089) 
Union membership x Socialist union (normalised)      -0.180** (0.071) 
Union membership x Christian union (normalised)      -0.077 (0.062) 
Constant 0.307*** (0.010) 0.240*** (0.011) 0.224*** (0.013) 0.224*** (0.013) 0.236*** (0.014) 0.236*** (0.014) 
Linear probability model x x x x x x 
Dependent variable: any positive reaction x x x x x x 
Vacancy fixed effects x x x x x x 
Observations 560 358 330 330 288 288 
Notes. See Section 4.2 for a definition of the variables adopted in the regressions. Except for “Union membership”, all variables are normalised by subtracting their means among the 
population of candidates mentioning youth union membership. Continuous variables are further normalised by dividing by their standard deviation among the same subpopulation. Standard 
errors, corrected for clustering at the vacancy level, are in parentheses. *** (**) ((*)) indicates significance at the 1% (5%) ((10%)) level. 
 
 
 
